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2 Abstract
The widening fiscal deficits and the increase of public debt triggered by the 
COVID-19 crisis suggest that fiscal policy makers will have to engage in substan-
tial fiscal consolidation in order to stabilize public finances in the mid run. How-
ever, the implementation of a fiscal consolidation package, if it is not properly 
designed, can be detrimental for growth and even lead to a self-defeating out-
come. In order to avoid this undesirable scenario, fiscal policy makers should rely 
on growth-friendly consolidation packages. The design of growth-friendly fiscal 
consolidation packages requires an understanding of the size of multipliers of dif-
ferent fiscal instruments. Thus, in this paper we provide the first deeper insights 
into the size of model-based disaggregated fiscal multipliers in Croatia. For this 
purpose, we have built a semi-structural macro-fiscal model of the Croatian econ-
omy and used Croatia’s experience during the fiscal consolidation episode under 
the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) to retrieve fiscal multipliers, analyse the 
design of the policy package and provide model-based evaluation of the macroe-
conomic effects of this consolidation episode. Our results indicate that the fiscal 
consolidation implemented during the EDP was not growth-friendly and that it 
was partially self-defeating. We hope that our results can help fiscal policy makers 
to avoid similar policy mistakes in future fiscal consolidations.







































































































shouldbebasedonfiscal instrumentswith lowfiscalmultipliersas theycould
ensuretherequiredfiscaleffortwithloweconomiccosts.
Thedesignofgrowth-friendlyconsolidationpackagesrequiresdeepunderstand-
ingoffiscal policy transmissionmechanismsandknowledge about the sizeof
fiscalmultipliersofdifferentfiscalinstruments,i.e.so-called“disaggregated”fis-
calmultipliers(e.g.Boussard,deCastroandSalto,2013;Cortuk,2013).Thus,the
keygoalof thispaper is toprovide thefirstdetailed insights intofiscalpolicy
transmissionmechanismsandthesizeofdisaggregatedfiscalmultipliersinCroa-
tia. Data on disaggregated fiscal multipliers can help fiscal policy makers in
designinggrowth-friendlyfiscalconsolidationpackagesinthefuture.
EstimatesoffiscalmultipliersinCroatiahavesofarbeenexclusivelybasedon
vector autoregressionmethodology (VAR) (Šimović andDeskar-Škrbić, 2013;
Grdović Gnip, 2014; 2015; Deskar-Škrbić and Šimović, 2017).Although the
VAR-basedapproachtotheestimationoffiscalmultipliersdominatesfiscallitera-









computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to analyse the macroeconomic






first time a small semi-structuralmacro-fiscalmodel of theCroatian economy.
Thismodelallowsustoretrievedisaggregatedfiscalmultipliersbycomparingthe
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4 changescenarios,fordifferentfiscalinstruments.Inaddition,thismodelallows
us to investigate the feedback frompolicy-inducedchanges inmacroeconomic
variablestofiscalbalancesandpublicdebt.However,wewanttoemphasizethat
themodelthatweproposeisnotonalargeenoughscaletobeabletocaptureall
the relevantmacroeconomic relations and the purpose of thismodel is not to
describe theCroatianeconomy indetailbut togiveabasic framework for the
analysisoftheeffectsoffiscalpolicy.Inaddition,theproposedmodel(likeother
models in this class) is facedwith variousmethodological limitations thatwe
explainindetailinthemaintext.














calculate the disaggregated fiscal multipliers for different revenue-side and
expenditure-side fiscal instruments. Then, we use these findings to analyse
whether theEDPfiscal consolidation episodewas growth-friendly.Our results
showthat,althoughtheconsolidationwassuccessfulintermsoffiscaloutcomes,































































































2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE ANALYSIS 
Inthispaper,webuildontwointer-relatedstrandsoftheliterature.First,weana-
lyse the literatureonfiscalconsolidations.Thisstrandof literatureprovidesan
analyticalframeworkforunderstandingthekeycharacteristicsoftheEDPfiscal
consolidationepisodeinCroatia.Second,wepresenttheliteratureontheevalua-



























consolidationmeasures, the literature shows that expenditure-based consolida-
tionsappeartobemoreeffectiveinstabilizingdebtthanthosethatarerevenue-






















































































Macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy and the size of fiscal multipliers
Discussiononthegrowtheffectsoffiscalconsolidationsnaturallyleadsustothe
secondstrandoftheliterature,whichinvestigatesthemacroeconomiceffectsof
fiscal policy changes and deals with the estimation of fiscal multipliers.6 The
extensive literature review provided by Spilimbergo, Schindler and Symansky
(2009)andCoenen,KilponenandTrabandt(2010), thedetailedtheoreticaland





micro-founded, with forward-looking expectations and based on the so-called
“deep”structuralparameters7thatdeterminethebehaviourofeconomicagentsin
















































































































As for the sizeoffiscalmultipliers, empirical-basedmultipliersare lower than












fiscal instruments (see appendix 4). Expenditure-based are usually higher than
revenue-basedmultipliers.However,differenttypesofexpendituresandrevenues
have different macroeconomic effects. Empirical literature shows that on the
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9Table 1
Structural consolidation measure (% of GDP)
2013 2014 2015 2016
Structural revenue measures
Increaseofthehealthcontributionsrate  0.5  0.2
Increaseofthepensioncontributionsrevenues  0.1  0.1  0.01
IncreaseofintermediateVATrate  0.2
Increaseinexcisesonoilderivatives  0.1  0.1  0.04
Increaseofexciserateontobacco  0.03  0.04  0.01
Changesintaxongamesofchance  0.03  0.01
LimitationofCITtaxrelief  0.1
Introductionoftaxoninterestonsavings  0.1
Total structural revenue measures  1.0  0.7  0.1
Structural expenditure measures
3%cutofpublicsectorwages  -0.2 -0.1
Cancelationoftheholidaybonus  -0.1
Abolishmentoftheserviceloyaltybonus -0.1
Reductionofsubsidies -0.3  -0.1  0.2
Constrainingintermediateconsumption -0.2 -0.1
Governmentinvestmentcut -0.4  -0.1 -0.1
Socialbenefitssavings -0.2  -0.1
Total structural expenditure measures  -0.3  -1.3  -0.2  -0.3
Total structural measures  0.3  2.2  0.9  0.4
Note: structural increase of pension contribution revenues is related to the transfer of public 
employees with accelerated pension plan from the 2nd to the 1st pension pillar.
Source: National budget; EC; authors’ calculations.
Figure 1
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Structural revenue measures, % of GDP
Figure 3
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11Figure 4
Decomposition of the change of general  
government balance (pp of GDP)
Figure 5
Decomposition of the change of general 
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However, fiscal sustainability is only one side of the coin.Another important
objectiveoffiscalpolicyismacroeconomicstabilization.12Thisgoalwasalsoput


























































































4 MACRO-FISCAL MODEL OF THE CROATIAN ECONOMY







4.1 MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MODEL
FollowingBrillet(2019),wedescribeourmodelasasmallmodelasitincludes







side” of the economy.The rationale for such amodelling approach is that the
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Structure of the macro-fiscal model of the Croatian economy
Import 
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but also it affects the investment demand that stimulates private investments.
GovernmentinvestmentsalsoentertheGDPidentityandstimulateprivateinvest-
mentsthroughthecrowding-inmechanism,whichwasconfirmedbydata.Subsi-
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15employeesenterstheGDPidentityrelationthroughgovernmentconsumptionbut










present the disaggregated fiscal multipliers for both the revenue-side and the
expenditure-side fiscal instruments and explain the main transmission mecha-
nisms,basedonfigure7.After that,weprovide the resultsofacounterfactual
scenarioanalysis,whereweaskourselveswhethertheCroatianauthoritiescould
haveachievedsimilarfiscaloutcomeswithlowereconomiccosts.




   (1)
Thealternativescenarioisaresultoftheimplementedshocktoexogenousfiscal
variables.More precisely, baseline scenario includes estimations of themodel
withimplementedEDPmeasures,whileinthealternativescenarioweadd(inthe































































































fiscal multipliers presented in Spilimbergo, Schindler and Symansky (2009),
Gechert andWill (2012), andKilponen et al. (2019).These authors report tax
multipliers in the rangeof -0.5 to -0.1,meaning that direct taxmultipliers are
higherthanindirecttaxmultipliers(alsoseeappendix4).
Table 2
Fiscal multipliers: revenue-side instruments
 2014 2015 2016 Average
Indirecttaxes 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Personalincometax  -0.2 -0.3 -0.2
Corporateincometax  -0.2 -0.2 -0.2


















personal income taxmultiplier at -0.2,which is quite strong as compared to the
effectsofindirecttaxes,inlinewiththetheoreticalandempiricalfindings.Thisis
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pliers presented in Spilimbergo, Schindler and Symansky (2009),Gechert and
Will(2012),andKilponenetal.(2017).Theauthorsreportmodel-basedgovern-
ment consumptionmultipliers in the range from0.5 to 0.9 and social benefits
multipliersintherangefrom0.2to0.4.Ontheotherhand,fiscalmultipliersof
publicinvestmentareusuallyaboveone(althoughmostestimatesareformore





Fiscal multipliers: expenditure-side instruments
 2014 2015 2016 Average
Publicwages 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3
Intermediateconsumption 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6
Subsidies 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Investments 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7
Socialbenefits 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
Source: authors’ calculations.
Inourmodel,publicsectorwageshavethelargestmultiplier,ofaround1.3.Sucha
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18 previouslynoted,publicsectorwagesareanimportantcomponentofgovernment
consumptionthatdirectlyenterstheequation(7)forthecalculationofGDP.Asthis
component of government consumption does not have an import component it
translatestoGDP“one-for-one”.Additionally,anyincreaseof(net)publicsector













through increased investment demand, which leads to higher investments and
employmentandthushigherconsumption.However,thesesecond-roundeffects






0.1.A lowsizeof themultiplierwasexpectedassubsidiesaffect theeconomy
onlythroughtheeffectoninvestments.However, thiseffect isnotstrong.This
especiallyholdstrueincountrieslikeCroatia,wheresubsidiesareusedmoreas
grants and less as investment-promoting instruments, i.e. they arenot efficient
(WorldBank,2014).Generally,theliteraturetreatssubsidiesasanunproductive
componentofgovernmentexpenditureandOECDpositionssubsidiesatthetop































































































Role of automatic stabilizers
Intheexplanationoftransmissionmechanismssofar,weconsciouslyneglectedthe
roleofautomaticstabilizers,duetothebrevityoftheexposition.However,automatic










5.2 COUNTERFACTUAL POLICY ANALYSIS
OuranalysissofarshowedthattheEDPfiscalconsolidationinCroatiawassuc-
cessfulintermsoffiscaloutcomes.Ontheotherhand,thereportedfiscalmultipli-






scenario implieda fallofGDP. In2015and2016under theEDPscenario, the
Commissionprojectedpositivegrowth rates, ifaround0.6pp lower than in the
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20 isimportantbecauseadeteriorationofeconomicactivitytriggeredbytheimple-
mentationofconsolidationmeasurescouldleadtoanadditionalincreaseininstead























the budget.20The structure of the consolidation package is presented in table 4,
whichshowsthatweonlychangedthestructureoftheexpenditure-basedmeasures,
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Growth-friendly fiscal consolidation package









derivatives 0.1 0.1 0.04
Increaseofexciserate 






Total structural  







Reductionofcapitaltransfers 0.0(-0.2) 0.0(-0.2) 0.0(-0.2)
Reductionofsubsidies  0.0(-0.3) -0.3(-0.2) -0.1(-0.2) -0.2(-0.2)
Constrainingintermediate
consumption -0.2 -0.1
Governmentinvestmentcut -0.4(0.0) -0.1(0.0) -0.1(0.0)
Socialbenefitssavings -0.2 -0.1
Total structural  
expenditure measures -0.3(-0.5) -1.3(-0.9) -0.2(-0.4) -0.3(-0.4)
Total structural measures  0.3(0.5) 2.2(1.9) 0.9(1.1) 0.4(0.5)
Note: new measures of the growth-friendly fiscal consolidation package are bolded in parenthe-
sis. The rest of the measures of the growth-friendly fiscal consolidation package are the same as 




























































































wepropose substantial cuts in subsidies.Rationalizationof subsidieswas also
proposed as a fiscal consolidation measure by theWorld Bank in the Public 


















Weighted expenditure-based fiscal multipliers
 2013 2014 2015 2016
EDP 1.3 0.6 0.7 0.6
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23Inordertoanalysetheeffectsoftheproposedgrowth-friendlyfiscalconsolidation
packageweevaluatedfiscalandmacroeconomicoutcomesinthecounterfactual







consolidation package.According to the results of the counterfactual scenario,
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in the future rely more on this kind of model-based evaluation and take into
accountthedifferentmacroeconomiceffectsofvariousfiscalmeasures.
5.3 MAIN METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS 
Beforewemove to theconclusions, it is important toexplainsomeof thekey
limitationsofourmodellingapproach.
Aspreviouslynoted,thepurposeofthismodelistoprovideananalyticalframe-
work for theanalysisof theshort-termmacroeconomiceffectsoffiscalpolicy.
Thus,thismodeldoesnotincludethesupplysideoftheeconomyandvariables


























sion can be subdued (Ramey, 2011; 2019).As for the reactions on the foreign
exchangemarket,itiswellknownthatfiscalpolicyismoreeffectiveincountries












































































































tian National Bank data show that the average change of the real effective
exchange rate in theperiod from2014-2016stoodataroundonly1% to2%.23 
Hence,wedonotexpect that changes infiscalpolicyhadadecisiveeffecton
exportsdevelopmentsduringtheEDP.
Next, we treat public sector and private sector wages independently. However,
changes in public sectorwages can affect private sectorwages and thus induce




















































































Althoughtheoryargues that investmentsshoulddependonthe levelof interest
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Theconsumption function inourmodel isbroadlybasedonModigliani’s life-
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On the labour market we define private employment EMPPRIVt and public



























































































income taxes per employee, social contributions for healthcare security per
employeeandsocialcontributionsforpensionsecurityperemployeemultiplied

























We start from the basic identity of the fiscal balance, which is the difference
betweentotalgeneralgovernmentrevenuesandexpenditures:




































































































divided, and their relevant macroeconomic bases are also compensations of
employees:
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 DEBTt =DEBTt-1 + FBt (A.31)
Primaryfiscalbalanceisdefinedastotalfiscalbalanceadjustedforinterestexpen-
ditures:
 FBtprim =TRt – TEt + INTt (A.32)
Interestexpenditureisannualizedanddefinedastheproductoftheimplicitinter-
estrateandthepreviouslevelofdebt:
















































































 dlog (IIRt)=IIR0 + dlog (DEBTt) + εtIIR (A.34)
Finally,thedecompositionofpublicdebtdynamicsisgivenbythestandardformula,
  (A.35)
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40 APPENDIX 2
ORIGINAL AND SIMULATED ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES (BASELINE)
Figure a2.1
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Figure a2.2
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Note: these figures shows only key endogenous macro and fiscal variables; figures of other vari-
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41APPENDIX 3
ESTIMATION RESULTS – KEY MACRO EQUATIONS
Consumption (long-run)
Dependentvariable:log(Ct)
Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob.
C0 3.71 0.37 9.94 0.00
log(YtD) 0.60 0.04 15.83 0.00
log(Wt) 0.10 0.01 8.20 0.00
Dt 0.03 0.00 7.31 0.00
R-squared  0.95
Regression: log(Ct)=C0 + C1 log(YtD) + C2 log(Wt) + Dt +εtC
Consumption (short-run)
Dependentvariable:dlog(Ct)
Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob.
c0 0.00 0.00 3.86 0.00
dlog(YtD) 0.53 0.22 2.37 0.02
dlog(Wt) 0.03 0.01 3.00 0.00
εCt–1 -0.19 0.05 -3.87 0.00
R-squared  0.63
Regression: dlog(Ct)=c0 + c1dlog(YtD) + c2dlog(Wt) + c3εCt–1 +μtc
Investments (long-run)
Dependentvariable:log(IPt)
Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob.
I0 -5.74 0.49 -11.75 0.00
log(IDt) 1.32 0.04 35.40 0.00
log(FDIt) 0.03 0.01 2.57 0.01
COSTt -0.55 0.05 -10.24 0.00
SUBSt–1 0.04 0.02 2.28 0.03
Dt 0.03 0.02 1.73 0.09
R-squared  0.92
Regression: log(IPt)=I0 + I1 log(IDt) + I2 log(FDIt) + I3(COSTt) + I4 log(SUBSt–1) + Dt + εtI
Investments (short-run)
Dependentvariable:dlog(IPt)
Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob.
i0 0.01 0.00 2.52 0.01
dlog(IDt) 0.32 0.11 3.06 0.00
dlog(FDIt) 0.02 0.01 1.87 0.07
d(COSTt) -0.84 0.08 -10.63 0.00
dlog(SUBSt–1) 0.00 0.02 0.12 0.90
εIt–1 -0.33 0.08 -4.10 0.00
R-squared  0.87
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42 Imports (long-run)Dependentvariable:log(Mt)
Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob.
M0 -7.72 0.69 -11.14 0.00
log(MDt) 1.58 0.07 22.03 0.00
log( ) -0.95 1.35 -0.71 0.48





Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob.
m0 -7.04 1.01 -6.96 0.00
dlog(TDt) 0.87 0.11 8.23 0.00
dlog( ) 0.21 0.07 3.02 0.00





Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob. 
EMP0 -0.62 0.78 -0.79 0.43
log(ITt–1) 0.34 0.07 5.23 0.00
log(Ct–1) -0.23 0.13 -1.83 0.07
Dt 0.98 0.42 2.35 0.02
R-squared  0.85
Regression: log(EMPPRIVt)=EMP0 + EMP1 log(ITt–1) + EMP2 log(Ct–1) + Dt + εtEMP
Employment (short-run)
Dependentvariable:dlog(EMPPRIVt)
Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob. 
emp0 0.00 0.00 3.20 0.00
dlog(ITt–1) 0.12 0.06 1.91 0.06
dlog(Ct–1) 0.12 0.04 2.99 0.00
-0.10 0.03 -3.71 0.00
Dt 0.01 0.00 6.81 0.00
R-squared  0.75
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43Inflation
Dependentvariable:dlog(CPIt)
Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob. 
π0 0.00 0.00 3.53 0.00
dlog(CPIt–1) 0.32 0.08 4.13 0.00
dlog(WTOTALt–2) 0.02 0.01 2.38 0.02
dlog(MPt) 0.12 0.06 2.00 0.05
dlog(OILt) 0.01 0.00 5.61 0.00
d(IMPL_INDt) 0.01 0.00 2.24 0.03
Dt 0.01 0.00 6.41 0.00
R-squared  0.64
Regression: dlog(CPIt) =  π0 + π1dlog(CPIt–1) + π2dlog(WTOTALt–2) + π3dlog(MPt) +π4 dlog(OILt) 
+ π5 d(IMPL_INDt) + Dt + εtCPI 
Unemployment benefits
Dependentvariable:UNEMP_BENt
Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob.
ub0 52433.02 11322.75 4.63 0.00
UNEMP_BENt–1   0.83   0.04 22.99 0.00
d(EMPTOTt ,4) -6892.60  1531.59 -4.50 0.00
Dt 69767.78 13227.75 5.27 0.00
R-squared  0.95
Regression: UNEMP_BENt=ub0 + ub1UNEMP_BENt–1 + ub2d(EMPTOTt ,4) + Dt + εtub
Implicit interest rate
Dependentvariable:IIRt
Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob.
iir0 0.04 0.00 53.77 0.00
d(DEBTt ,4) 0.07 0.01 12.27 0.00
Dt 0.01 0.00 4.42 0.00
R-squared  0.68



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































45 (1) 1-61 (2021)
45APPENDIX 5
ANNOUNCED STRUCTURAL MEASURES DURING THE EDP
Table a5.1
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47APPENDIX 6
MORE DETAILS ON THE EDP IN CROATIA








Forecast of macro and fiscal variables under baseline and EDP scenario (Decem-
ber 2013)
Real GDP growth % 2014 2015 2016
Nopolicychange 0.5 1.2 1.7
EDPscenario -1.0 0.6 1.1
 
Requiredstructuralmeasures,%ofGDP 2.3 1.0 1.0
 
Structuralbalance,nopolicychange -5.9 -5.8 -6.1
Structuralbalance,EDPscenario -4.0 -3.1 -2.4
Generalgovernmentbalance,nopolicychange -6.4 -6.0 -6.0
Generalgovernmentbalance,EDPscenario -4.6 -3.5 -2.7
Generalgovernmentdebt,nopolicychange 64.7 68.8 72.3
Generalgovernmentdebt,EDPscenario 63.9 66.1 66.8




and the recommendationon itscorrection,andofficiallyactivated theEDPfor
Croatia(EuropeanCommission,2014b).




mendations, additionalfiscalmeasureswereadopted inApril in theamountof
0.4%ofGDP.Inthesamemonth,theGovernmentintroducedtheConvergence 
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1) Pre-EDP consolidation phase
Thisphasestartedin2013andendedwiththe2014Budgetrevisionthatantici-
patedtheactivationoftheEDPforCroatiaandalreadytackledtheunsustainable





2) Main EDP consolidation phase 
Inthisphase,Croatianauthoritiesintroducedthemainconsolidationpackageafter
theofficialactivationoftheEDP.Thepackageincludedthemainconsolidation









3) Implementation phase 
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